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Abstract
Strategic group analysis is attracting considerable interest in the
fields of economics and strategic management. The studies to date have
focused on relatively simple industries, such as airlines, brewing and
major home appliances, and have generally been static in nature. That
is, they produce a picture of strategic groupings at a particular point
in time. However, they rarely address the theoretical questions of how
these strategic groups arise and where they might lead to in the future.
In this study, the notion of benchmark strategic groups is developed
using a theoretical model and game theoretic concepts. Benchmark groups
represent long-run strategic positions available within an industry and
can be used by a representative firm as reference points in formulating
its competitive strategy. By considering its current resources/skills
and also the current state of the industry, a firm can decide on its
target benchmark in order to achieve a sustainable long-run competitive
position. An example for an industry with three important strategic
dimensions is presented as well as a sample analysis linking these
benchmarks with the formulation of competitive strategy.

1.0 Introduction
Conceptually, there is agreement on the definition of strategic
groups: "A strategic group is the group of firms in an industry
following the same or a similar strategy along the strategic dimensions,
(Porter, 1980: 129). Procedurally, there is great diversity amongst
researchers who have tried to identify strategic groups. The differ-
ences arise mainly from their choice of strategic variables which
represent the elements of the firm's strategy. With many different
strategic dimensions advanced by researchers, the use of cluster analy-
sis typically leads to different strategic groupings (firm clusters).
The objectives in existing empirical studies, which are briefly
reviewed in section 2, have been one (or a combination) of the
following: the identification of current strategic groups, the speci-
fication of the relationship between performance and strategic group
membership and the examination of movements between strategic groups.
Most studies demonstrate the existence of strategic groups at a par-
ticular point in time but rarely address the theoretical questions of
how these strategic groups arise and where they might lead to in the
future. The relatively few dynamic group studies have concentrated
primarily on the stability of strategic groups and the nature of
mobility barriers from the viewpoint of industry structure rather than
as an aid to strategic management.
In this study, the concept of benchmark strategic groups will be
developed. Benchmark groups develop as industries evolve and represent
long-run strategic positions available as the industry matures. A firm
in a given strategic group can use the benchmark groups as reference
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points in formulating its strategy. By matching its current resources
and skills with the requirements of each benchmark group, the firm can
decide upon its target benchmark and thereby design a strategy to
achieve a sustainable long-run competitive position.
It should be noted that these benchmark strategic groups are
derived using the concept of dominated strategies—for instance, an
average product cost/average quality strategy will be dominated by a
below average product cost/average quality strategy, given that product
cost and quality are the important strategic dimensions.
The paper develops the benchmark concept in the following manner.
Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on strategic groups while
Section 3 introduces the model, its assumptions and shows an example
of its use. Section 4 discusses the relationship between the concept
of efficient frontiers and strategic management. Finally, Section 5
summarizes the research conclusions and discusses further extensions
of the model.
2.0 Literature Review
This section reviews the main studies on strategic groups by such
writers as Hunt (1972), Newman (1973, 1978), Hatten (1974), Patton
(1976), Porter (1976, 1979), Oster (1982), McGee (1984), McGee and
Thomas (1984), Ryans and Witt ink (1984), Hergert (1983), Primeaux
(1983, 1984), Fiegenbaura and Primeaux (1983), Dess and Davis (1984),
Hawes and Crittenden (1984) and Kumar et al. (1984). The review
characterizes these studies with respect to their methodology, the
environment of the study, the purpose of the study, and the strategic
dimensions used to form viable strategic groups.
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a) Methodology
Except for McGee (1984), McGee and Thomas (1984) and Kumar et al.
(1984), all the studies are empirical in nature, using multivariate
statistical analysis approaches such as factor analysis, cluster
analysis and regression analysis, to justify the conclusions in the
respective papers. McGee (1984) and McGee and Thomas (1984) suggest a
taxonomy of dissimilarity sources among firms to aid in defining stra-
tegic dimensions. Kumar et al. model the competition in an industry
as a market game and derive theoretical results.
b) Environment of the Study
Almost all the studies concentrate on intra-industry analysis
since a strategic group, as defined by Hunt (1972), is:
A group of firms within the industry that are highly
symmetric ... with respect to cost structures, degree
of product differentiation, degree of vertical inte-
gration and the degree of product diversification
... formal organization, control systems and management
reward, and punishment ... (and) the personal view and
preferences for various possible outcomes. (pp. 8-16,
emphasis added)
The only exception appears to be Newman (1973, 1978) who defined stra-
tegic groups on the basis of relationships which firms had outside the
industry.
c) Objectives of the Studies
With the exception of Kumar et al. (1984), all the studies assume
the existence of strategic groups. However, they research a number of
different issues. Most studies lintc performance with strategic group
membership [Hatten (1974), Hergert (1983), Newman (1973, 78), Oster
(1982), Patton (1976), Porter (1976, 1979), Dess and Davis (1984),
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Hawes and Crittenden (1984)]. Some more recent studies model interac-
tions between strategic groups over time (to indicate evolution, mobi-
lity and stability) [Oster (1982), Hergert (1983), Fiegenbaum and
Primeaux (1983)]. More recently, from a game-theoretic perspective,
Kumar et al. (1984) use theoretical constructs to show existence of
strategic groups and prove, given model assumptions, the existence of
a linkage between the number of strategic groups and the number of
strategic dimensions. They also characterize industry structure by
measuring differences between strategic groups and propose similar
measures to characterize individual strategic groups by measuring dif-
ferences between firms in a given group.
d) Strategic Dimensions Chosen
The choice of strategic dimensions has varied from single measures,
such as relative size (Porter, 1976, 1979), security price movements
(Ryans and Wittink, 1984), market share (Fiegenbaum and Primeaux,
1983), investment behavior (Primeaux, 1983, 1984), to multiple measures,
such as degree of product differentiation, vertical integration and
product diversification (Hunt, 1972), variables corresponding to
marketing, finance and manufacturing (Hatten, 1974), firm size and
scope (Patton, 1976), and finally, managerial input, product com-
plexity and buyer diversity (Hergert, 1983). Only Hatten (1974) and
Kumar et al. (1984) categorized the strategic variables as being
controllable (i.e., firm level) and uncontrollable (i.e., environmen-
tal); Kumar et al (196<+) characterized the uncontrollable variables as
being industry aggregate statistics of controllable variables while
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Hatten (1974) used industry aggregates as well as elements of market
structure as uncontrollable variables.
This brief review points to several limitations and characteristics
of past research in this area:
1) Most of the studies are snapshots in time except for Oster (1982)
and Fiegenbaum and Primeaux (1983), who conduct studies across
time, and Hergert (1983), who links strategic groups to product
life cycle stages.
2) None of the studies look at forecasting future strategic groups or
even strategic directions, which firms may pursue, to anticipate
the long run evolution of the industry structure. Oster (1982)
and Fiegenbaum and Primeaux (1983) attempt to establish stable
strategic groups over time but they do not use this information to
predict future structure.
From a strategic management perspective, it would be clearly
desirable to predict the possible "benchmark" strategic groups which
will emerge as the industry evolves. Given these benchmarks, a firm
could formulate strategies directed towards the achievement of more
favorable (to the firm) strategic groupings in the future. Whether it
is successful or not would depend on technology, competitive reactions
and the implementation efficiency of the firm.
The model formulated in the next section is a step in this research
direction.
3.0 The Model
From a managerial point of view, the brief literature review showed
that past research offers few clues as to how or why a particular firm
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is where it is (in a particular strategic group) and also how it may
move into a position or grouping that is more favorable to itself. In
other words, past research has been more of a stationary descriptive
kind, picturing the status quo. This indicates a need for theoretical
research into the formation and evolution of strategic groups in an
industry.
Kumar et al. (1984) propose a game-theoretic model of a monopo-
listic competitive industry and show how strategic groups may arise
even though firms are identical in cost structures and preferences.
This model is very similar to those developed by Karnani (1982, 1984)
in the strategy literature. In the Kumar et al. model, the iden-
tification of strategic groups requires the explicit knowledge of
the firms' utility functions in terras of strategic controllable and
uncontrollable variables [as is the case in Karnani (1982, 1984)].
Unfortunately, the estimation of utility functions is an immensely
difficult task and consequently the game-theoretic model has minimal
practical significance from a strategy formulation perspective.
An alternative model for prediction of the possible set of strate-
gic group structures in an industry is presented in this section. The
model base is essentially similar to that of Kumar et al. (1984) but
drops the stringent requirement of specific functional forms. The
results derived from this model provide possible strategic groupings
which are called theoretical benchmarks. These benchmarks signify
generic structures which could emerge in the process of industry evo-
lution. Recognizing these generic structures and the current industry
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structure, a firm can choose strategic directions to move into one of
the generic structures that is most favorable to itself.
Using the model provided by Kumar et al. (1984), the basic ele-
ments used to capture the strategic behavior of firms include goals/
objectives (personified by a utility function), possible actions or
resource decisions (involving controllable strategic variables say, in
the areas of marketing, finance and manufacturing) and environmental
constraints (in the form of non-controllable variables) chosen to
describe the competitive nature of the industry. For the sake of
exposition the strategic controllable variables will be assumed to be
marketing strategy MK, measured by the sales to marketing expenditure
ratio, manufacturing strategy MF, measured by the sales to invested
capital dollars, and financial strategy FN, measured by the inverse of
2
the weighted average cost of capital. It is also assumed that they
can be computed and controlled by firm level strategists. The non-
controllable variables, depicting competition, will be assumed to be
industry average marketing strategy AMK, industry average manufac-
turing strategy AMF and industry average financial strategy AFN.
A reasonable behavioral assumption for the controllable variables
is that strategists should exhibit increasing preference over the
strategy variables, i.e., they prefer a higher value for the sales to
marketing expenditure ratio, a higher value for the sales to invested
capital dollars ratio and a higher value for FN since a lower weighted
average cost of capital value is required. It is also assumed that
each of these variables is measured on an ordinal scale, relative to
the corresponding uncontrollable variable or industry average variable.
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More specifically, the number of classes on the ordinal scale will be
restricted to 3, namely, above average, average, below average. [See
Hall (1980) for an application of this type of measurement.]
3.1 Valid Efficient Frontiers or Benchmark Strategies
Given the above assumptions, a strategy for a firm is defined by
the triplet (MK, MF, FN) where the values of MK, MF and FN are measured
as belonging to one of three classes: 1) below average, 2) average and
3) above average. For example, (3,1,3) is a strategy denoting above
average marketing and financial strategies and below average manufac-
turing strategy.
The above definitions dictate that every firm choose a point in a
cube, each lattice point referring to a unique strategy. Given the
assumption of monotonic firm preferences over the strategic variables,
(3,3,3), which represents above average strategies in marketing, finance
and manufacturing is the ideal strategy at any given point in time.
The next assumption is that the viable strategies, in any strategic
grouping structure, must be those on the efficient or current tech-
nology frontier. Essentially, this implies that the frontier strategies
are not dominated by others on the frontier while, at the same time,
the frontier forms a dominated pair with every other strategy not on
it. To make these concepts precise,
Definition : Strategy i, namely (MK,, MF., FN.), is said to be
superior to strategy j, namely (MK.., MF.. , FN^) if and only if
j j j
MK, > MK., MF. > MF., FN, > FN
.
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with, at least, one strict inequality. In this case, strategy j
is said to be inferior to strategy i. The pair of strategies
(i,j) is said to form a dominated pair .
Definition : Two strategies are mutually compatible (non-
dominated) if neither one is superior (or inferior).
Definition : An efficient or current technology frontier F is
a set of strategies {(MK^ MF^ FN
][
), ..., (MK
£
,
MF
£
,
FN
£ )}
such that
Condition a) each strategy in F is mutually compatible
with every other strategy in F.
Condition b) all the strategies not in F are either
superior or inferior to some strategy in
F, i.e., for every strategy not in F,
there is, at least, one strategy which
forms a dominated pair.
Condition a) represents the idea that only those strategies that
are preference-comparable, from the firm's perspective, can survive in
any strategic group structure. Condition b) ensures that all the other
available strategies for the firm form dominated pairs with the effi-
cient frontier, i.e.,
(i) if an available strategy is inferior to one in F, then
obviously it cannot be on that efficient frontier.
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(ii) if an available strategy is superior to any strategy in F,
then, assuming F is the current state of the technology,
strategy j is not yet achievable and cannot be on that
efficient frontier.
These two conditions a) and b) are similar to the definition of the
stable set solution concept used by Von Neumann-Morgenstern in game
theory (Owen, 1968: 166).
It should be noted that, for example, strategy (3,3,3) is an effi-
cient frontier set (consisting of one strategy) but it cannot be con-
sidered a valid frontier since if this is what the entire industry
chooses, then this is also the industry average—it cannot be above
average in all the strategies! Therefore, to make the concept of
industry averages compatible with efficient frontiers, we define:
Definition : A valid efficient frontier F* is an efficient
frontier that satisfies
Condition c) each variable represented in F* must, at
least, take on the values of above average
3
and below average in F*.
Each of the strategies in F* are considered to depict a strategic
group and the entire set F* is considered to be a proxy for an equi-
librium. The rationale behind this is that the market demand may be
distributed among the various strategies (in F*) in such a way as to
allocate equal utility to each strategy in F*. In such an event, no
firm has any inclination to change its strategy (or its membership in
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any group) Co another one in F* which makes F* a self-sustaining equi-
librium strategy frontier. This equilibrium concept is a close
approximation to the notion of Nash equilibrium used by Karnani (1982,
1984) and Kumar et al. (1984).
It must be noted that F* is a local equilibrium in the sense that
each firm is indifferent between the strategies in F*. There is an
incentive for all firms to achieve a strategy which dominates those in
F* since, then, the other strategies may become dominated leading to
higher gains to the firm achieving the dominant strategy.
3.2 Examples of Benchmark Concepts
Let us consider some examples of these concepts. The set
{ (3,2,3) , (3,3,2)} is an efficient frontier but does not satisfy con-
dition c) and hence is not a valid efficient frontier. The set of
strategies { (1,1,3) , (1,3,1) , (3,2,2)} is a valid efficient frontier with
three strategic groups. The first strategic group of firms, using
strategy (1,1,3), adopt above average financial strategy (while being
below average in the other two); the second group, using strategy
(1,3,1), adopt above average manufacturing strategy (while being below
average in the other two) and the third strategic group, using strategy
(3,2,2), adopt above average marketing strategy while achieving the
industry average in the other two. Notice that no group dominates any
other group and the concept of average is maintained. If the market
allocates values to the three strategic variables in such a way that
the utility achieved by each of the strategies is the same, then the
valid efficient frontier is a local strategic group equilibrium, i.e.,
no firm has any incentive to move to another strategic group. However,
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there is an incentive to break out of this equilibrium to a more domi-
nant position, e.g., a firm using strategy (3,2,2) could direct its
resources to increasing its manufacturing competence, i.e., move to
strategy (3,3,2). If it does achieve this, then it will eventually
eliminate any firm using its previous strategy (3,2,2) since it is
dominated. It also effectively dominates the group using strategy
(1,3,1) but strategic group (1,1,3) is not dominated. However, notice
that { (1, 1,3) , (3,3,2)} is an efficient frontier but not a valid one
(since all firms have average or above average financial competence).
This clearly implies that, with the exit of firms and changes in asso-
ciated strategic group positions, new averages have to be computed and
a redistribution of firms within the strategy cube becomes necessary.
3.3 Results
Since the strategic space defining the domain of feasible strate-
gies, i.e., the cube, is finite (in fact, 27 possible strategies) and
the frontier is clearly defined, the valid. efficient frontiers can be
completely enumerated. This was done using a computer program and the
entire list appears in the Appendix. The following characterization
emerges from analyzing the list:
Result 1 : There are 113 possible valid efficient frontier
sets F*. Of these, 6 have cardinality 3, 40 have cardinality
4, 57 have cardinality 5, 9 have cardinality 6 and 1 has
cardinality 7.
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Result 1 lists all possible valid frontiers which may have the
local optimum property, i.e., no firm will desire to move to another
existing strategic group. This is very similar to the Nash equilibrium
concept in non-cooperative game theory. Further refinements in this
equilibrium position could be addressed in the following manner: which
of these strategic group equilibria will persist even if the utility
function (i.e., preferences, demand distribution, cost structures) is
perturbed by a small amount? If the equilibrium persists following
perturbation, then it is said to be structurally stable [similar to
the continuous space version in Kumar et al. (1984)].
It is claimed that those valid efficient frontiers which have stra-
tegies which are identical in one dimension and perfectly inversely
correlated in the other two strategies are not stable under pertur-
bation. For example, consider F* = { (1,1,3) , (1,3,1) ,(3,2,2) } , in which
the strategies (1,1,3) and (1,3,1) are equivalent in terras of marketing
strategy and symmetric but inversely correlated [i.e., (1,3) and
(3,1)] in terms of manufacturing and financial strategies. If F* is
to be an equilibrium, then the utility associated with these strategies
is exactly the same or there is an imputed symmetric valuation of the
manufacturing and financial strategies. If we perturb this valuation
in favor of either of these dimensions, say manufacturing, then utility
equalization can only be potentially regained (assuming only the lower
utility group, i.e., (1,1,3) moves) by the configuration (1,2,3) and
(1,3,1), i.e., an improvement in manufacturing strategy by the first
strategic group. But, then F* { (1,2,3) ,(1,3,1) , (3,2,2)} is no longer
efficient—it needs the strategy (3,1,3) to make it a valid efficient
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frontier. This shows that the nature of the strategic group completely
changes with just a minor perturbation. This leads to Result 2, which
indicates all the structurally stable valid efficient frontiers:
Result 2 : The only structurally stable valid efficient
frontiers (i.e., benchmark strategic group structures) F**
are 12 in number and are:
(1)
1
(1,1, 3), (1,2, 2), (3, 1,2), (3, 3,1)}
(2)
| (1,1,3), (1,3, 2), (2, 1,2), (3, 3,1)}
(3) (1,1, 3), (1,3, 2), (3, 2, 2), (3, 3,1)}
(4) | (1,1, 3), (2, 3, 2), (3, 1,2), (3, 3,1)}
(5)
I
(1,2, 2), (1,3,1), (3, 1,3), (3, 2,1)}
(6) J (1,2, 3), (1,3,1), (2, 2,1), (3, 1,3)}
(7)
I
(1,2, 3), (1,3,1), (3, 1,3), (3, 2, 2)}
(8) J (1, 3,1), (2, 2, 3), (3, 1,3), (3, 2,1)}
(9)
| (1, 3, 3), (2, 1,2), (2, 3,1), (3, 1,1)}
(10) |[(1, 3, 3), (2, 1,3), (2, 2,1), (3, 1,1)}
(11) • (1,3, 3), (2, 1,3), (2, 3, 2), (3, 1,1)}
(12) • (1,3, 3), (2, 2, 3), (2, 3,1), (3, 1,1)}
A rationale for studying stable frontiers is that one might be
looking at the mature stage of the industry life cycle, where there is
potentially the stablest industry structure with relatively minor
environmental perturbations. This model would, therefore, predict
that for an environment of mature industries, given the three strategic
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diraensions of marketing, manufacturing and financial strategies, only
the above stable frontiers F** can emerge.
Some features of the stable frontiers are worth mentioning:
(i) The cardinality of all the stable frontiers is exactly 4.
This fits with the instability theorem in Kumar et al. (1984) which
states that given 3 uncontrollable strategic dimensions, only 3 plus
one or 4 strategies, at most, can occur. Further, it is conjectured
that this result is independent of the arbitrary measurement of the
dimensions in the 3 classes.
(ii) In all the stable frontiers there is always one strategic
dimension which is present only in above and below average classes
while the other two appear in all three classes.
(iii) In line with (ii), the strategy (2,2,2) or average in all three
dimensions is not a stable strategy. This implies that in any mature
industry, firms probably have to specialize, i.e., be superior in at
least one dimension, be it marketing, manufacturing or finance. This
is consistent with Porter's (1980) argument about generic strategies.
(iv) There is equi-preference shown across the twelve stable fron-
tiers. Therefore it is impossible to predict which strategic group
structures may obtain in the future. However, these twelve strategies
provide stable valid efficient frontiers and thus serve as benchmark
group structures.
The relationship of Results 1 and 2 to industry analysis and stra-
tegic management will be discussed in the next section.
-16-
4.0 The Relationship between Efficient Frontiers
and Strategic Management
In the previous section a specific model form was used to illu-
strate how the concept of dominated strategies could develop valid
efficient frontiers F*. These frontiers were refined, using structural
stability concepts, to derive the benchmark strategic group structures
F**. This section shows how these frontiers can be useful in industry
analysis and strategic management.
Once appropriate controllable strategic dimensions are specified,
an analysis, as presented in Section 3, can be immediately conducted to
identify the valid efficient frontiers and also the generic benchmark
strategic group structures which could possibly arise in a structurally
stable industry. Thus, this analysis gives researchers an idea of
potential future strategic groupings which might emerge in the mature
stage of the life cycle. It also gives managers the opportunity to
identify those strategic groupings which are particularly suited to
their firm's own accumulated expertise. It also indicates the possible
strategic positioning tactics the firm may adopt in order to survive
and thrive in the industry and not be a victim of any industry
"shake-out" process.
The comments following the derivation of Result 2 in Section 3
imply that there is no preference ordering amongst the 12 stable fron-
tiers. Therefore, in order to establish which one of them is going to
be actually realized, it is necessary to perform an empirical analysis
4
to identify the current industry status. Since the measurement of
strategic dimensions is based on discrete classifications, the strategy
space defining the domain of all feasible strategies can be represented
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by the cells of a cube (or a hypercube, if more than 3 dimensions or 3
classes of measurement are used). Industry-level data can then be used
to compute the cut-off points in the cube by clearly defining what is
average, below average and above average (if there are 3 classes of
measurement). For example, the marketing strategy cut-off points could
be constructed by looking at a 90% confidence interval for the mean of
the industry sales over marketing expenditure ratio. Those ratios fal-
ling within this interval are termed average and those falling below
(above) this interval labelled as below (above) average marketing
strategy. Given these cut-off points, a clustering procedure can now
allocate each firm to a unique cell representing its current strategic
position (see Hall (1980)). This clustering analysis gives the firm an
idea of current industry structure and how it is positioned relative to
other firms in terms of specified strategic dimensions.
The strategic management aspect of the analysis becomes apparent.
The firm knows the possible generic strategic group structures which
could arise in the future, and also its current status relative to the
industry. By matching its strategic capability alongside the generic
group positions, it can decide whether it wishes to maintain the status
quo or move to another strategic group.
For example, suppose that the industry currently shows the following
strategic group structure, namely, { (1,1,2) , (1,2,1) , (1,2,3) , (1,3,1) , (3,1,3)}
Consider a firm in the strategic group (1,2,1). Obviously, it is in a
disastrous position (since it is dominated by firms using strategies
(1,2,3) and (1,3,1). It needs to spend resources improving its posi-
tion vis-a-vis its competition. Which position should it aim for,
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given its current position? It is clear that the groups (1,2,3),
(1.3.1) and (3,1,3) do not dominate one another and represent stable
positions in benchmark groups 6 and 7 of Result 2. The easiest (and
probably least expensive) action would be to aim for strategy (2,2,1),
which is the remaining element of benchmark group 6. This implies that
the firm in group (1,2,1) has to improve its marketing strategy.
Continuing this analysis further, a firm in the strategic group
(1.1.2) is in an equally disastrous position (being dominated by firms
using strategies (1,2,3) and (3,1,3)). It may choose to adopt as its
objective, the strategy (1,2,3) rather than strategy (2,2,1) since in
the latter case it will have to worsen its financial strategy position
while in the former case, it will be building on its strengths. After
the decision has been made, it must attempt to improve its manufac-
turing and financial strategies.
One implicit assumption in the above dynamic analysis is that the
strategic dimensions do not change. This is not a very reasonable
assumption and therefore the preceding analysis cannot be looked upon
as a global analysis. But it is true that the strategic dimensions do
not change in shorter time intervals and for these periods, such an
analysis is extremely useful to guide strategy formulation. Until a
theory becomes available to allow the prediction of changing strategic
dimensions (which may depend on internal and external technology, R&D,
consumer tastes and economic conditions), a more global analysis cannot
be presented. However, some forms of sensitivity analysis could be
undertaken with this model using strategic dimensions which industry
experts predict to be important in the future. Comparisons can then be
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made between the two sets of benchmark groups; the one based upon the
set of current key strategic dimensions and the other based upon pre-
dicted future key dimensions.
5.0 Summary and Conclusions
Past research in the area of strategic groups has concentrated
mainly on describing the strategic group structure as snapshots in
time. There has been no significant attempt (except in extrapolating
stability results from Oster (1982) and Fiegenbaum and Primeaux (1983))
to predict the movement of industry strategic groups or even to aid the
strategic management analyst in the formulation of dynamic strategies.
This paper is a step in this direction. The model base assumes
controllable and uncontrollable strategic dimensions, which, once spe-
cified, can lead to the derivation of both valid efficient frontiers
and stable valid efficient frontiers. The derivation of these fron-
tiers is based on simple concepts of dominated strategies, stable sets
in game theory and the idea of structural stability.
This paper also shows how these frontiers, when combined with a
knowledge of current industry strategic groupings, can form the basis
of strategy formulation for the future. The analysis is applicable to
all industries and encompasses any time span, as long as the strategic
dimensions do not vary over that time period; otherwise, this analysis
can be thought of as a (fixed time period) local analysis to aid in
strategic management.
The most important extension of this research would be to explain
and predict movements in the key strategic dimensions over time.
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Other possible areas of research include the use of stochastic pro-
cesses to model the uncertainties in the groupings (through a relaxa-
tion of the efficient market assumption) and in developing the linkage
between the industry life cycle and the evolution of strategic
groupings.
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FOOTNOTES
The results of that paper, namely that the number of strategic
groups is critically dependent on aggregated competitor strategies,
remains valid when the stringent assumption of identical competitors
(i.e., same form of utility function and parameters) is relaxed.
2
The marketing and manufacturing strategy variables involve measur-
ing sales. Since sales for the next period is unknown and normally
uncontrollable (i.e., not directly controllable except in a monopoly),
the figure used could be sales for the last period or even forecasted
sales for the next period. The choice of the inverse of the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) rather than WACC itself, as the financial
strategy variable, is to facilitate increasing preference over this
variable.
3
This condition also eliminates the possibility of all the strate-
gies using the same average value for any variable. The reason for
this is that this variable is no longer strategic, i.e., no firm dif-
ferentiates itself from its competitors on this variable.
4
Here we are assuming that the industry being studied or analyzed
has been in existence for some period of time.
-22-
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Appendix
In this appendix, the problem formulation for the efficient
frontier model is explained and also the listing of the valid efficient
frontiers F* is given.
The problem formulation is as follows:
strategy space C = {(i,j,k)| i = 1,2,3, j = 1,2,3, k = 1,2,3}
strategy = (i,j,k) = (MK,MF,FN)
where marketing strategy MK
(or) 1, below average
manufacturing strategy MF = 2, average
(or) 3, above average
financial strategy FN
Enumerate
F* = { (i, tj , ,k, ) , ..., (i ,i ,k )|they form valid efficient frontiers}i 1 ,J 1» 1 ' n J n n ' J i
There are 113 such valid efficient frontiers and these are listed in
Table 1.
Ta ble 1
Number Cardinality
3
Valid Efficient Frontier Strategies
1 113 131 322
2 3 113 232 311
3 3 122 313 331
4 3 131 223 311
5 3 133 212 331
6 3 133 221 313
7 4 113 122 212 331
3 4 113 122 312 331
9 4 113 131 222 311
10 4 113 132 212 331
11 4 113 132 221 312
12 4 113 132 231 322
13 4 113 132 322 331
14 4 113 232 312 321
15 4 113 232 312 331
16 4 113 232 322 331
17 4 122 131 221 313
18 4 122 131 313 321
19 4 122 213 231 311
20 4 122 213 312 331
21 4 122 231 313 321
22 4 123 131 212 321
23 4 123 131 213 322
24 4 123 131 221 313
25 4 123 131 313 322
26 4 123 132 212 331
27 4 123 132 221 313
28 4 123 213 232 311
29 4 123 232 313 321
30 4 131 223 312 321
31 4 131 223 313 321
32 4 131 223 313 322
33 4 132 223 231 311
34 4 132 223 312 331
35 4 133 212 221 311
36 4 133 212 231 311
37 4 133 212 231 321
38 4 133 213 221 311
39 4 133 213 221 312
40 4 133 213- 231 322
41 4 133 213 232 311
42 4 133 222 313 331
43 4 133 223 231 311
44 4 133 223 232 311
45 4 133 223 313 332
46 4 133 232 323 331
47 5 113 122 131 212 321
Table 1 (continued)
Number Cardinality
5
Valid Efficient Frontier Strategies
48 113 122 131 221 312
49 5 113 122 131 312 321
50 5 113 122 212 231 311
51 5 113 122 212 231 321
52 5 113 122 231 321 321
53 5 113 131 222 312 312
54 5 113 132 212 221 311
55 5 113 132 212 231 311
56 5 113 132 212 231 321
57 5 113 132 222 231 311
58 5 113 132 222 312 331
59 5 113 122 131 212 321
60 5 113 122 131 221 312
61 5 113 122 131 312 321
62 5 113 122 212 231 311
63 5 113 122 212 231 321
64 5 113 122 231 312 321
65 5 122 131 213 221 311
66 5 122 131 213 221 312
67 5 122 131 213 312 321
68 5 122 213 231 312 321
69 5 123 131 212 221 311
70 5 123 131 213 221 311
71 5 123 131 213 221 312
72 5 123 131 213 222 311
73 5 123 131 222 313 321
74 5 123 132 212 221 311
75 5 123 132 212 231 311
76 5 123 132 212 231 321
77 5 123 132 213 221 311
78 5 123 132 213 221 312
79 5 123 132 213 231 322
80 5 123 132 213 322 331
81 5 123 132 222 313 331
82 5 123 132 231 313 322
83 5 123 132 313 322 331
84 5 123 213 232 312 321
85 5 123 213 232 312 331
86 5 123 213 232 322 331
87 5
.
132 232 313 322 331
88 5 " 132 223 231 312 321
89 5 132 223 231 313 321
90 5 132 223 231 313 322
91 5 132 223 313 322 331
92 5 133 213 222 231 311
93 5 133 213 222 312 331
Table 1 (continued)
Number Cardinality
5
Valid Efficient Frontier Strateg ies
94 133 213 232 312 321
95 5 133 213 232 312 331
96 5 133 213 232 322 331
97 5 133 222 231 313 321
98 5 133 223 231 312 321
99 5 133 223 231 313 321
100 5 133 223 231 313 322
101 5 133 223 232 312 321
102 5 133 223 232 312 331
103 5 133 223 232 313 321
104 6 113 122 131 212 221 311
105 b 113 132 222 231 312 321
10b b 113 122 131 212 221 311
107 6 123 131 213 222 312 321
108 b 123 132 213 222 231 311
109 b 123 132 213 222 312 331
110 b 123 132 222 231 313 321
111 b 133 213 222 231 312 321
112 b 133 223 232 313 322 331
113 7 123 132 213 222 231 312 321



